Over the course of my two terms as President of European Metals, Europe’s debate on industry and its policy has put critical raw materials, circular metals and security of supply at the core of discussions on European strategic autonomy and industrial competitiveness.
That is a welcome change, but recognition alone does not keep a smelter open, bring an idled plant back online, lower electricity costs or make a strategic project bankable. For Europe’s metals industry, these past four years have been about closing that gap between political recognition and industrial reality.
When I first took this role in 2022, the situation was already very serious. Energy prices were spiraling, smelters were closing or being curtailed, and roughly half of Europe’s aluminium production capacity had been forced offline during this crisis. This also forced us to come face to face with the fact that Europe’s dependence on third countries on critical raw materials could no longer be treated as a secondary concern.
The first priority was clear - to bring industrial competitiveness, energy costs and raw materials security to the top of the EU agenda. European Metals argued consistently that Europe cannot build clean technologies, strengthen defence and electrify its economy if it loses the metals value chains that make all this possible.
One key step was the introduction of the Critical Raw Materials Act. European Metals pushed for a broader understanding of what is strategic, where aluminium eventually reclaimed its rightful place on the strategic raw materials list. Through its Raw Materials 2030 work, European Metals tried to put numbers behind the political ambition: Europe would need new mines, new processing plants and new recycling facilities if it wanted to meet the objectives of the CRMA.
Since then, the EU has put forward several important initiatives such as the Steel and Metals Action Plan, the Clean Industrial Deal, RESourceEU Action Plan and the Industrial Accelerator Act. These proposals show that there is appetite to integrate industrial competitiveness firmly at the heart of Europe’s goals.
For the European metals sector’s future, the priorities are therefore clear.
The Affordable Energy Action Plan must lead to immediate, real and predictable cost reductions for industrial consumers. Access to competitively priced, firmed PPAs, lower taxes and charges, better grid planning and more competitive network tariffs are all useful objectives. But they need to be felt in actual electricity bills. Metals producers remain exposed to global competition, and Europe cannot ignore the gap between its energy costs and those faced by competitors in other regions.
The RESourceEU Action Plan must help deliver strategic projects. Europe needs more domestic production, more processing capacity and more recycling. Circularity has evolved from an environmental objective into an industrial imperative. This shift is increasingly reflected in initiatives such as the forthcoming Circular Economy Act, discussions on scrap leakage measures and the implementation of the Critical Raw Materials Act.
The Industrial Accelerator Act must support the full value chain. Demand-side measures for clean technologies can help, but they will not be enough if Europe loses the upstream materials needed to manufacture those technologies. Public procurement, resilience criteria and industrial support should therefore reflect the importance of European production and processing.
The Clean Industrial State Aid Framework must be revised and made usable. European Metals has argued that support should not only focus on new investments, but also on preserving and restarting existing capacity where this strengthens security of supply. If the framework is too narrow, too complex or too difficult to access, it will not answer the needs of energy-intensive industries. As it is now, it lacks this ability.
The ETS needs careful correction. Indirect ETS costs remain a major burden for electricity-intensive metals producers, therefore indirect cost compensation must continue beyond 2030, as well as free allocation. Any new, and unrealistic, reductions in the fallback benchmark values which are not reflective of what industry is capable of with the current available technologies will undoubtedly jeopardize CRM production further. This is a key problem that must be taken seriously.
Unless these bottlenecks are addressed, climate policy will weaken European production without reducing global emissions.
The rebrand from Eurometaux to European Metals in 2026 also reflects this deeper evolution and marked a new tone for the sector: more confident, more outward-looking and more aligned with the scale of Europe’s industrial challenge: European metals are connected to everything we are building our future on.
This is not the end of the journey, far from it. Europe has reached a crossroads where the implementation of policy will determine whether it can compete globally and secure a seat at the table. The frameworks are increasingly in place, but they alone do not preserve capacity, unlock investment or rebuild competitiveness. What is needed is genuine action on the ground.
For companies deciding whether to invest, all of these issues come together in one question: does Europe offer a viable business case?
The answer to this will decide whether Europe can retain the metals value chains it needs, or whether strategic materials, industrial value and technological leadership will continue to drain away to other competing regions. If we allow production to leave, along with the factories, we lose the very building blocks of securing autonomy and leverage for years to come.
Europe holds the capability, the expertise, the technology and the industrial ambition to secure its place in the world and drive economic growth and prosperity. The metals industry is ready to lead this path, if we allow it.
Source: From Recognition to Delivery: Safeguarding Europe’s Metals Core for the Next Generations | Euractiv
